De pactis theses

can be elicited from [the facts]. Examples of this are in Laws 2, 3, 4, and elsewhere in the Digest, under the same title.

IX.

Furthermore, some pacts are in rem (in rem), others in personam (in personam). They are in rem as often as I bargain generally not to sue. They are in personam as often as I bargain not to sue a specific person.

X.

The significance of this division is great. For pacts in rem benefit not only the person bargaining, but also their heirs. Likewise, a real pact of a seller benefits the buyer, and a convention concerning a thing benefits the surety, whereas the contrary is the case in a personal pact.

XI.

The proximate efficient cause of a pact is the consensus of the contracting parties; the remote cause is the ius gentium (law of nations), although it may also be said that, by way of confirmation, pacts belong to the civil law or the praetorian law.

XII.

But pacts also do not subsist without a just cause for the convention, such as compensation, donation, or the like. In obligatory pacts, this cause is never presumed, although it is otherwise in liberatory ones.

XIII.

Moreover, all those who are not prohibited may make a pact.

XIIII.

Prohibited, first, are all those who cannot provide consent: such as an infant, a madman, one who is mentally disabled, and the like.

XV.

But what must be determined regarding the mute and the deaf? These cannot make a pact expressly, but they can do so tacitly.

XVI.

Puberty-aged children, as well as minors having a curator, cannot make their own condition worse through a pact without the authority of a tutor or curator, but they can [make it] better