De pactis theses

XXXII.

But pacts confirmed by oath or stipulation also beget an action: as is the case in the most recent law, if they are made by handwriting or by writing, or even if they are interposed in a judgment.

XXXIII.

Indeed, although all these things proceed according to the civil law as has been stated, it is nevertheless received by canon law and by usage that an action is granted from any pact whatsoever.

XXXIV.

But, you will say, which ones? Setting aside the disputes of the Doctors, I shall maintain that a condictio based on canon law is competent.

XXXV.

Whether, however, a pact removes actions, is asked? I respond that, regularly, it does not, except by the aid of an exception.

XXXVI.

Furthermore, it is more true that pacts are of strict law, unless they are appended to contracts of good faith. For then they assume their nature.

XXXVII.

And for that reason, a pact made regarding another matter, or with another person, ought neither to harm nor to benefit in another matter or with another person, unless the law or the agreement of the parties persuades that the same be done.

XXXVIII.

To pacts, as also to consent, nothing is so contrary as error, force, fraud, and fear.

XXXIX.

But also, a subsequent pact removes a prior one, not indeed by the law itself, but by the aid of a replication.

Ownership of things is transferred not by naked pacts, but by traditions and usucaptions.