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A decorative initial letter V contains a floral/foliage design.
SINCE medicine is called the daughter and fruit of theoretical philosophy, and knowledge of the latter contributes much to the εὐχημοσύνην decorum/proper conduct of a physician, I thought it would not be a pointless endeavor to touch lightly upon a few points, both from first philosophy and especially from second philosophy.
I.
First philosophy, although it considers Being insofar as it is Being, is nevertheless rightly and more frequently called by Aristotle the science of separate forms.
II.
Separate minds are the primary species of the subject of this same philosophy: and yet it is not absurd that they are not parts, but principles, of the subject.
III.
Because indeed in the sciences, if the subject is πρὸς μίαν φύσιν related to one nature, the science is of the primary itself, as is held in 4 Metaphysics, t. 2, first philosophy will be of substance. For accidents are, or rather are said to be, Beings because of it.
IV.
But if science in such subjects is of the primary, what reason will there be why natural philosophy, which does not have a univocal subject as is clear from 10 Metaphysics, should not be concerned solely with the primary?
V.
And likewise, why in the same, since one must begin from the multiple by division, are the common principles and common affections of the subject investigated before descending to proper ones? Shall it be permissible for us to ἐπέχειν withhold judgment here, or should we rather acquiesce to the common opinion?
VI.
Furthermore, the natural philosopher, descending from common to proper matters, considers these in a certain order, according to whether they are simple or recede from the simple.
Sim-