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are not imaginable.
Whence it comes about that, with good reason, pestilential diseases, as well as others which are propagated by contagion, are said to be intemperate. For what is contagion, or this contagious quality, other than a putrid heat?
That contagious things are σηπεδονώδη putrid/rotten, both reason persuades and experience confirms. For neither is evaporation more apt to corrupt neighboring bodies, as is evident from the example of external putrefying things: nor is there a contagion that does not seem to consist in putrefaction. Galen asserts the same in 1 On the Differentiation of Fevers. Nor did the philosopher intend anything else by φαῦλον, βαρὺ base/evil, heavy/offensive, etc.
This putrefaction is not required as a preliminary disposition for the production of contagious power, or as a cause without which it does not exist: but it is the essence of the contagion itself. Hence, the quality is communicated to others in the same species.
But not every putrefaction causes this: but usually that which contains something glutinous and κνησμῶδες itching/irritating. Nor is it necessary to create deep putrefaction: but it is enough to establish a peculiar and certain degree or mode of it.
Hence it happens that not all contagious diseases are deadly, but some of them threaten no danger: while the mere excellence of the affected part renders others dangerous.
It is clear, therefore, that all such affections, whether they be pernicious or mild, are the offspring of putrefaction, and therefore of a depraved intemperance.