... Conclusiones aliquot physiologicae de sensibus

that the senses are affected by sensible qualities immaterially and spiritually.

XVIII.
Therefore, they interpret that passage—"for the excess of every sensible object destroys the sensory organ"—(book 2, On the Soul, context 123 & 14[?]; and book 3, final context) as happening not through itself, but by accident, insofar as some agent is joined to it, which acts with a natural action.

XIX.
But if the sense is affected by a subject thing, it is necessary that both dissimilarity, when it suffers, and similarity, when it has suffered, be present (book 2, On the Soul, context 54 & 62).

XX.
It is common, therefore, that each sense knows both the things subject to it, their privations, and also their excesses, but by a different reason.

XXI.
It is common, furthermore, to all senses that each one is in potentiality such as the very thing is which it is about to perceive (book 2, On the Soul, context 51, 62; and book 3, context 28).

XXII.
The senses do not operate by sending their powers outward, but by receiving the species of things through media (book 2, On the Soul, chapter 7). However, it rightly pleases some of the most learned moderns to settle the dispute with Plato, Aristotle, and Galen by saying that vision occurs in both ways.

XXIII.
Thus, senses do not come to be unless sensible objects are present (book 2, On the Soul, context 61).

XXIV.
Sensible objects are, in themselves, some common to many senses, such as Motion, Rest, Number, Figure, and Magnitude; others proper to each individual sense, such as color and splendor for sight, sound for hearing, odor for smell, flavor for taste, and tangible qualities for touch (book 2, On the Soul, context 63 & 64).

XXV.
In the sense, a certain mediocrity of that contrariety which exists in sensible objects is found (book 2, On the Soul, context 118).

Whence,