Diogenous Laertiou Peri biōn, dogmatōn kai apophthegmatōn tōn en philosophia eudokimēsantōn biblia 10

...from which we may learn, first, to wipe the blush from the face to lose one's sense of shame: (for what is more pernicious to courtiers than modesty?) then, to be sycophantic, fond of lying, fond of money, fond of jesting, fond of sarcasm, and fond of pleasure. I will also add (to gratify your courtly people) a fondness for drinking. This, indeed, is the sweet life, the delightful life, the thrice-blessed life. But what? (you will say, my Crato) Do you place me, too, in the number of those courtiers? By no means. For not everyone who is a courtier, that is, who lives in the court, is to be thought a courtier in life and morals. Since, therefore, I believe that a certain life—composed of the lives of many philosophers, namely Aristippus (who was certainly a truly courtly philosopher), Diogenes, Crates, Epicurus—suits those I have mentioned, I believe that the Socratic life is appropriate for you and those like you. But I have joked enough. For everyone knows that from this work of Diogenes, we should seek not what makes us better, but what makes us more learned. I would have said wiser, had I not remembered from Horace himself that the wise is coupled with the good. As when he writes in Epistle, Book 1:
Nor think another happy, besides the wise and good.
Likewise,
Or to crawl silently through healthy woods, / Caring for whatever is worthy of the wise and good?
Likewise,
The good and wise man will dare to say, Pentheus.
Likewise,
The good and wise man says he is prepared for worthy things.
And Cicero himself complains that the wise are separated from the good, and says that this brings great ruin. This, therefore, is that ruin (he says), that they consider some to be good, others to be wise. Yet, when I say that from these books of Diogenes we must seek what makes us more learned, not what makes us better, I would not want this to be understood...