You ask about God: in the very asking, you already assume something. For when you ask what He is: you assume quidditatem quiddity or "what-ness"; when you ask if He is: you assume essentiam essence or "is-ness". When you ask "on account of what" or "because of what": you assume cause and end. Thus, every question concerning God becomes trivial: for He is superior to every question and doubt, just as immense light is superior to darkness. You see, furthermore, that the creature is unable to deny God. For when it says that He "is not": it already enunciates something. And that which it enunciates actually affirms that He "is," especially since the "being" of any being assumes a supreme "Being." Thus, the creature can no more deny God than it can deny itself: for to do so would be a kind of foolishness, imperfection, and impotence. For this reason, the madness of Simon Magus is refuted, who accused Paul for saying that God cannot deny Himself. Therefore, the impious man is not punished because he denies God, but because he thinks he is denying Him. How laughable, then, are the Epicureans who think they deny God: yet by their very assertions they affirm His existence, being exactly like those who claim they do not exist, even as they are proven to exist by the very act of making that claim. This is just as if one were to establish the number one while rejecting vnitatem unity.

If small things may be compared to great ones: sight is nothing in the region of colors; likewise hearing in the region of sounds; nor is the unit anything in the region of numbers; nor finally is the point anything in the region of magnitudes. Therefore, neither is the supreme Unity found in the region of creatures. Furthermore, if you weigh the greatest unity in power and potential—as being greater than any number—and the minimum unity in discernment and division: you will recognize that the maximum and minimum coincide in that same Unity. That which is minimum is the beginning of numbers. That which is maximum terminates every number and is the end of all numbers. Therefore, these also exist in the supreme Unity. Indeed, since the supreme Unity and God is the Absolute Maximum: He is all things, not only those which are, but those which can be. And since He is all that can be: nothing can be opposed to Him. Therefore, the minimum coincides with Him. Thus, God is "most greatly" all things because He is "least" all things. He is most greatly good because He is "least" good. The same applies to all other things. But enough of these matters for now.

From the above, you may easily perceive that number consists of the finite and the infinite. For if you apprehend a multitude without unity: it is a kind of infinity. But it is finished by the One. Therefore, because every number is a certain multitude and a certain vastness: it is from the infinite. But because it is from unity, and because it usurps the name of unity (with unity unifying that multitude): it is from the finite. In this part, it is not difficult to perceive the supreme and immense virtue of that highest Unity. For because virtue follows unity (so much so that things which are more united are found to have greater virtue, and those less united, less virtue; for unity is the cause of union, while plurality, which contains a kind of infinity within itself, is the cause of alterity and division), it follows that those things which approach more fully to unity are to that extent "more one" and of greater virtue. And those which recede further from unity and fall toward multitude are of lesser virtue. Hence, earth is of lesser virtue than fire. But what else is it to recede from plurality than to approach unity? And to recede from unity than to approach plurality? Especially since to recede from one opposite is to approach the other. Therefore, those things which recede more from plurality are of greater virtue. If they recede further, they are greater still. if they recede most of all, they are greatest. If they recede infinitely: surely, by this manner of rising, they are gathered to be of infinite virtue. Wherefore, since God recedes by an immense degree from plurality, and by that same immense degree approaches unity: He is weighed as an infinite Unity and of infinite virtue. Thus far concerning the unity of numbers and of things.

Furthermore, since there are three causes of things—God, Nature, and Man—nature is entirely subject to the providence of God, responding to it in every part. Insofar as beings exist outside the mind: a single unity is discerned by us, namely God, by whom each individual thing is distinguished; and we make the unity of our mind analogous to Him. It remains only to assign unity in those things which are from man. It does not occur to me that unity should be placed in things that are disordered. Someone might admit that inordination is annexed to order. For where there is unity, there is number. And where there is number, there is order and harmony. Wherefore, the Pythagoreans rightly placed evil, the infinite, and likewise the false as that which does not proceed from unity, since from unity alone comes number, discernment, and harmony. Therefore, unity must be established only in those things which are ordered. And we must discuss them in the manner of the Pythagoreans, who philosophized about all things through numbers: but concerning evil, we discuss it through the opposite, through the infinite, the indiscrete, and alterity.

Therefore, let the unity of the truths of our mind be its conformity to the thing: as that which is one, partless, and individual, no less than the substance of a circle. For that which does not reach the mark cannot be judged true. Just as that which does not fill the fullness of a circle is not a circle; nor is that which does not fill unity, one. The unity of good things is conformity to reason, which is identically one. Thus the Pythagoreans rightly said: "a man is good in one way, but wicked in many ways" This refers to the idea that virtue is a single point of balance, while vice is an infinite deviation in any direction.. That these things correspond not without reason to unity in numbers is immediately clear. For just as unity is the discernment and substance of numbers: so also these are the

Book I. 13

discernments and substances of the true and the good. Indeed, the true is that which has its correspondence in the object. And the good is that which is consonant and conformable to reason. Likewise, true things are discerned by that correspondence to the object, and good things by that of reason. So much so that those which approach more closely to these are "truer" and "better." And those which approach less: are less good, less true. Hence, necessary things are truer than contingent things. And among necessary things: principles are truer than conclusions. Common things truer than specific ones. And metaphysics truer than the particular sciences. Likewise, the internal act is truer than the external. The essential truer than the non-essential. One virtue truer than another. Persuaded by these things, the Pythagoreans, discussing all things through numbers, established minimums in individual things. By these, they labored to discern all other things. And these minimums were called "units" by them. And on the occasion of this matter, we must wander a little further.

A voice is more perfect insofar as it signifies: because it exists more in the nature of speech and writing in the context of meaning than in its mere physical existence as sound or ink. In no other way should things be judged more perfect than insofar as they are certain images of God, representing God himself as good, great, and wise. Thus a garment is more precious insofar as it belongs to a king than simply as a garment. If the garment could recognize that it belongs to the king, how it would delight! From this depends the vehement exultation of the saints. "It is good for me," says the prophet, "to adhere to God" original: "mihi adhærere deo, bonum est". If we were to notice these things with diligence: those works which are good would urge themselves upon us as being referred to God and not to ourselves. And we would confess that they belong far more to God than to us. Thus no one would glory in their works, regarding them as their own: for indeed they are more excellent as they are of God. From this flows ordered charity, which seeks not its own, and recognizes nothing as its own: but all things as belonging to the beloved and to God. Therefore, those people are vain who rest in the beauty and perfection of a creature without referring it to something further; they are much more impotent than those who, sticking only to elements, are unable to elicit syllables from elements, or words from syllables. And he who, attending only to voices, makes nothing of their meaning: is almost exactly like one who stops at the mere scent of the prey, regarding neither the sight nor the touch of it. For what else is a creature than a certain scent of the divine Unity? Thus they "run to the odor of his ointments" A reference to the Song of Solomon 1:3-4 who strive to comprehend Him by means of creatures. And those who run in this race of mortal life do so so that, having measured the course of their function, they may reach that prey of infinite flavor. He who stops at the creature stops at the scent, and is as much inferior as he is remote from sight and touch.

Indeed, this world is seen to be like the voice of a teacher: which students receive differently. For some apprehend only the sound; others, the significance of the voice, like those educated in a grammar school. Finally, there are those who apprehend the mind of the master: like those in a higher school. In this way, some (as is the custom of beasts) remain content with the sensation of things alone. Others watch over the proper uses of things, to be examined by the path of reason: like those who follow natural studies. Finally, others seek not the proper uses of things: but their symbolic significance, in which class are those educated in the school of wisdom. And he who divides things themselves into three parts will perhaps not err. For some things are only signified: like that supreme Trinity, which is the truth of all and the image of none. Others, on the contrary, signify: like numbers. And others, finally, allow for both, like the beings of nature. The natural scientist embraces things insofar as they are signified. But the wise man himself discusses both numbers and things συμβολικῶς symbolically. And such is the dignity of numbers: insofar as they are symbols suitable for us of the divine intelligences. For indeed, we strive to recognize truth only through an image. And by this reason, I would believe it was not without cause that the ancient Magi sought out the mystical significance of numbers in all things. For he who embraces only numbers in mathematics, thinking nothing of their mystical significance: is like an eye existing in darkness, valuing light not at all. You see, therefore, from where the mystical philosophy of the ancient wise men flowed: namely, those who accepted all things as certain signs and symbols. Furthermore, some of these expressed the unformed and divine through sensible forms, like the prophets. Others expressed the same through numbers, like a good part of the Pythagoreans, whom I have chosen to follow in this work. But having wandered thus far, I now return to the author.

Threefold consideration method of number Number, in the first place, is divided into even and odd. And this division is of number according to itself. For there is a threefold consideration of number. First: absolute, according to itself. Second: in some part geometrical. Third: relative, and serving music entirely. Number is considered absolutely and in itself: when it is neither referred to another, nor, expressed by its units, does it present any form of a geometric figure. In this way, it is assigned absolute names, not relative ones. For it is called even, odd, diminished, perfect, or abundant. But when it is considered according to figure: then it takes the names of figures, and is called square, pyramid, or cube. Furthermore, when it is referred to another: there is a greater or lesser inequality. And it is called double,