On the Soul (De Anima) with Simplicius Commentary

scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. But the employment of intellect, properly so called, is to apply itself to things by simple projections, in a way superior to demonstration. For as sense, by its projecting energy, when it meets with something white or some particular figure, has a knowledge of it superior to demonstration—since it is not in need of a syllogism in order to perceive that this thing is white, but knows it by simple projection—thus, also, intellect knows intelligibles Things capable of being understood by the mind; abstract forms. by a simple application of its gnostic power, in a manner superior to demonstration.

The energy of intellect, however, is alone present with those who have arrived at the summit of purification and science, and who, through the cathartic virtues Virtues that cleanse the soul from the attachments of the body and senses., are accustomed to energize without imagination and sense See this explained in the notes on the third book.. For intellect is, as it were, the most perfect habit of the soul; whence, also, Plotinus A major philosopher of the ancient world and founder of Neoplatonism., speaking of this, says, “He who energizes according to it will know what I say,” because it is not possible to explain such an energy by words. But of these powers, intellect has the first order, opinion the last, and dianoia ranks in the middle, the energy of which is appropriate to our soul, since it also possesses a middle order in the universe. Through this power—I mean the dianoetic power—our soul is elevated to the contemplation of intelligibles, which is the perfection of the soul. For, since our soul is nourished with, and allied to, sensibles, it is impossible, in consequence of her association with the senses, that she can immediately elevate herself to the contemplation of intelligible and immaterial forms; but at first she thinks that these also are bodies, and have magnitude and other sensible properties. Thus, also, Plato in the Phædo says, that

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