On the Soul (De Anima) with Simplicius Commentary

These common conceptions, therefore, which all men possess, are evidently resemblances of intellect. Hence, intellect is said to be the principle of science, by which we obtain a knowledge of intelligibles. Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics, says concerning this, against those who are of the opinion that there is no such thing as science, that we not only say there is science, but also the principle of science by which we have knowledge of "terms." By terms, he means either common conceptions or intelligibles, which are the boundaries of beings. A term, as the geometrician says, is the end of something; and intelligibles are the highest extremities of beings.

Of the irrational powers of the soul, some are gnostic Knowledge-acquiring. and others are vital and orectic Related to desire or appetite.. The gnostic powers are phantasy and sense. These differ from each other because sense is extended toward external things, but the phantasy possesses knowledge inwardly. Sense only knows what is present and apprehends it externally; but the phantasy, receiving the types or impressions of sensibles from sense, fashions them within itself. Whence, Aristotle calls it "passive intellect"—intellect, because it has the object of knowledge inward and applies itself to this object by simple projection, like intellect and without proof; but "passive," because its knowledge is accompanied by impressions and is not free of figure. It is also called phantasy, as being phantasia tis original: "φαντασία τις", or "a certain permanency of appearances," for it establishes within itself those things which are externally apparent. Each of these powers is extended toward a partial object; for it knows this particular white thing, and not everything white. They differ in that one knows what is external, and the other what is internal.