On the Soul (De Anima) with Simplicius Commentary

nutriment and the generative powers, so that it would seem to follow that desire is the same as the vegetative powers. What, then, shall we say? That it is not the same. For desire, indeed, acts in conjunction with sense; but the vegetative powers act without sense. Hence, irrational animals are excited to appetite by the sight of females; so that desire is attended with a certain knowledge, but this is not the case with the vegetative energies. Indeed, we frequently emit seed while asleep, no sense or imagination having preceded the emission, and we do this in consequence of acting according to the vegetative powers. For, as when reason is enslaved by the irrational part, it employs every means to gratify luxurious appetite, and yet we do not on this account say that reason is the same as the vegetative powers; thus, also, we say with respect to desire. The peculiarity, however, of the vegetative powers is simply to aspire after nutriment and coition, unattended with sensation; but the peculiarity of desire is to aspire after certain nutriment, a certain coition, and, in short, after that which produces delight. Is there, then, one and the same end of desire and of the vegetative power? There is not. The end of the latter is simply nutriment or coition, and the end of desire is pleasure. This, however, is the end of desire, so that by this tendency we may preserve the condition we are allotted in the universe and the succession of our race. But to reason, when it enslaves itself to desire, there is no certain peculiar end for this energy, because such an energy is unnatural to it. And things which are unnatural are not directed to a certain end. For reason in this case, like a slave, procures pleasure not as its own end, but as the end of desire. Have we, then, three souls, and are we governed by three souls? To this we reply, that as the soul, from its union