On the Soul (De Anima) with Simplicius Commentary

with this body, appears indeed to form but one thing, yet in reality is not one thing; thus, also, by the conjunction of the irrational and vegetative powers, it produces, through contact, one certain continuity. For the irrational is proximately suspended from the rational part, but the vegetative from the irrational part. Through the sympathy arising from this contact, we say that there is one soul, and that the irrational part uses the subordinate or vegetative powers as instruments. Of these powers, however—I mean the irrational and the vegetative—some are more and others less near to the rational soul. The irrational powers, indeed, are nearer, because they are capable of being obedient to reason. On which account, by reproving desires, we render them more mild. Hence Homer Homer, the ancient Greek epic poet. represents Ulysses striking his breast, and thus addressing his heart:

Poor suff'ring heart! he cry'd, support the pain
Of wounded honour, and thy rage restrain.

Hence, also, the precept: accustom yourself to subdue anger, pleasure, pain, and the like. But the vegetative powers, as not being obedient to reason, are more remote from the rational soul. For it is not possible to order the nutritive power to nourish, or the augmentative to increase, or the generative to generate only to a certain extent. If, however, we render the generative power more moderate, it is evident that we do not simply repress this power itself, but desire; for the power remains nevertheless, though it does not act. And such are the rational, irrational, and vegetative powers of the soul.

In short, with respect to the soul, some of the ancients say, that it is