On the Soul (De Anima) with Simplicius Commentary

immortal, some say that it is separable from the body, but others that it is inseparable. And of those who say that it is inseparable, some assert that it is the ratio of the temperament; as, that if a double or a sesquialter sesquialter: a ratio of 3:2 quantity of fire, or fire in any other ratio, is mingled with water, it will produce soul. For that double or sesquialter ratio is the soul. But others assert that the temperament itself is the soul. Others, again, assert that it is entelecheia: the realization or actualization of a potentiality. But entelecheia is the perfection and form of the subject. Ratio, however, differs from temperament. For ratio is surveyed in quantity, such as in the sesquialter, or in the double, and the like. And, in short, the definite habitude, according to quantity, of this thing to that is the ratio of the things mingled. But temperament is the quality which arises from the mixture of qualities. Thus, for instance, a certain temperament—i.e., the tepid—is produced from the hot and the cold, or a brown color from the white and the black. But entelecheia, as we have said, is the perfection of the subject; i.e., it is the form which accedes to matter from a certain composition of the elements; as to clay the form of a shell accedes. But of those who assert that the soul is separable, some say that every soul is separable from the body—the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative; and this was the opinion of Numenius Numenius of Apamea (2nd century AD), a Neopythagorean philosopher., who was deceived by what Plato Plato (c. 427–347 BC), the Greek philosopher. says in the Phædrus Plato's dialogue on the soul, love, and rhetoric., “that every soul is immortal,” though he is there evidently speaking about the human soul. Others again assert that every soul is inseparable from the body, and is on this account mortal, among which is Alexander Aphrodisiensis Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 AD), a famous commentator on Aristotle., who also endeavours to draw Aristotle to his opinion. But others assert that the rational soul is separable, but that the irrational and vegetative are inseparable. Of these, however, some assert, that both the irrational and vegetative soul