INTRODUCTION.

something superior even to being itself; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source; and it does not, therefore, think fit to group it with any triad or order of beings. Indeed, it even apologizes for attempting to give an appropriate name to this principle, which is in reality ineffable, and ascribes the attempt to the imbecility of human nature. This nature, striving intently to behold it, gives the appellation of its most simple conceptions to that which is beyond all knowledge and all conception. Hence Plato denominates it the One and the Good; by the former of these names indicating its transcendent simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to all beings—for all things desire good. But Orpheus, as Proclus well observesIn Plat. Cratyl. p. 23., “availing himself of the license of fables, manifests everything prior to Heaven (or the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order) by names, as far as to the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the intelligible unities, Time.” And this, according to a wonderful analogy, indicates the generation—that is, the ineffable evolution into light of all things—from the immense principle of all.