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cannot be done to the good man except by one unequal to him, injury cannot happen to the wise man. For it is unnecessary to observe that no man is a good man unless he is a wise man. But it may be said that Socrates was unjustly condemned, and that he received an injury. Here, however, it is necessary to understand that a man may be a noxious character himself, though he has not injured another. If anyone lies with his own wife as if she were the wife of another, he will be an adulterer, though she will not be an adulteress. Some one may give poison to another, but the poison being mingled with food may lose its power; he who gave the poison is guilty, though it did no injury. He is no less an assassin whose dagger is eluded by the opposing garment. All wickedness, even prior to its existence in action, is perfect, so far as is sufficient to the crime. Some things are of that condition, and are so conjoined, that the one cannot be, and, on the contrary, others so subsist, that the one may be without the other. Thus, a man may move his feet, and yet not run; but he cannot run without moving his feet. A man may be in water, and yet not swim; but he cannot swim without being in water. The condition of what is now discussed is of this kind. If a man receives an injury, it is necessary the injury should be done; but if