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In that state, neither duality nor non-duality remains—"neither duality nor non-duality" (Tantraloka a major work by Abhinavagupta).
In the Parabrahman Supreme Absolute of Advaita-Vedanta Non-dualistic Vedanta, there is neither the pulsing power (spanda-shakti) found in Parama-Shiva the Supreme Shiva, nor is there any similarity between the Maya-shakti power of illusion of Brahman and the power that is inseparable from Shiva. Therefore, in the Pratyabhijna Recognition philosophy, the establishment of Parama-Shiva is proven to be "superior" even to the non-dual Brahman, and is equivalent to the Krishna-tattva principle of Krishna of Shuddhadvaita Pure Non-dualism.
In the theory of appearance (vivartavada), the effect is considered non-different from the cause paramarthatah in the ultimate sense; however, vyavaharah in empirical practice, the effect appears different from the cause. This is its falsity. However, in the Pratyabhijna philosophy, this cause-effect relationship has not been explained in such great detail; the tenets have simply been stated in clear words.
Although the perspective of the Pratyabhijna philosophy regarding the world is similar to that of Advaita-Vedanta, it does not explain it through the medium of vivartavada. Why is this? The question remains unanswered. Perhaps the Pratyabhijna philosophy does not consider the world a mere appearance of Parama-Shiva at all, because in its view, the world is reflected in Shiva "like a city in a mirror." This is a unique analogy. The illusory knowledge of a snake in a rope or silver in a seashell is possible, but how can there be an illusion in the knowledge of a city reflected in a mirror? The mirror (Parama-Shiva) is real, the city (the world) is also real, and both realities are one—due to the unity of the substrate of the subject and the object.
In the illusory knowledge of Vedanta, the substrates of the snake and the rope, or the shell and the silver, are ultimately different; they only appear non-different in empirical practice, creating a false superimposition (mithyadhyasa).
However, in Pratyabhijna, this false superimposition does not exist at all. Therefore, there is no place for "illusory knowledge" there, nor any controversy—at least regarding the existence of the world. However, this does not mean that the concept of mithyadhyasa false superimposition does not exist at all in the Pratyabhijna philosophy.
In Pratyabhijna philosophy, Parama-Shiva is called independent and self-luminous (prakashatma). That which is independent cannot be inert. Acharya Abhinava explicitly states: "Independence is called self-luminosity. Inertness is called dependence on external light" (Tantraloka).
That is, only an independent object is self-luminous, whereas an inert object is dependent on another for its illumination. A dependent object has no independent existence. Kshemaraja also accepts this view—found in the Shivasutra-Vimarshini—that what lacks consciousness is "non-existent."