Euthymius Zigabenus, Panoplia Dogmatica; Theodoretus, Historia Religiosa

of the speaker, will be thought to have substance, moving according to the likeness of our own. For just as this non-existent nature of ours, being fragile, also has a fragile word logos, so the incorruptible and ever-living nature has an eternal and subsistent word. If this should be confessed as the logical consequence, that the word of God theos subsists eternally, then it is necessary by all means to also confess the subsistence of the life of the word. For it is not to be thought in any way that the word subsists lifelessly, after the likeness of stones; but it subsists as a certain intellectual and incorporeal thing. If, however, it is entirely separated from life, it is not in substance at all; but it is demonstrated to be impious for the word of God theos to be insubstantial. Therefore, it was demonstrated as the logical consequence that this word is contemplated in life. Since the nature of the word is believed to be simple, as is fitting, and shows no duality or composition within itself, one would no longer contemplate the word in life by way of participation in life; for such a notion would not be free from composition, as saying one thing is in another. But it is necessary by all means, while confessing its simplicity, to think of the word as self-life, not as participating in life. If the word lives, as being life, it also possesses by all means a volitional or desiring power; for nothing of living things is without volition. And it is cautious to think that this volition, and the ability to act, is in accordance with the logical consequence; for if someone were not to confess that it is possible, he would entirely construct the impossible. But surely the impossible is far removed from the supposition concerning the divine; for nothing of those things which are absurd is seen concerning the divine nature. And it is necessary by all means to confess the power of the word to be as great as its intention, so that there may not be some mixture and concurrence of opposites or it might be contemplated as simple; but it would not be uncompounded in power even if it were to proceed concerning what is contemplated; if indeed it is powerful in one thing, but toward another it is powerless. But that the volition of the word is able to do all things,