Philonis Judaei Opera Omnia (Vol. 8)

let us endeavor to persuade the matter primarily through arguments taken from reason. Therefore, the arguments are of this kind.

§. 2. Is providence irrational, or rational? Rational, certainly.

But does the one who affects providence with accusation do so rationally, or irrationally? I would say rationally.

Is he himself also devoid of providence an improvident person, who blames it? Indeed, yes.

How, therefore, will he who is destitute of providence be able to accuse providence, since he himself lacks providence? For it cannot happen that he brings forth legitimate accusations, since he is not himself previously educated and instructed in the understanding of the good. That is true.

But if someone proves himself a sufficiently good accuser of the good, inasmuch as he is wise, we will in no way say that he is devoid of providence, since he who criticizes it seeks providence wisely. It is so.

§. 3. But in knowing providence, does one know improvidence? Indeed.

Is providence the opposite of improvidence? Why not?

If, therefore, the matter is so, providence itself rejects improvidence that is: where providence is, there improvidence will not be. It is necessary.

But not providence through improvidence. Certainly not.

He, therefore, who blames improvidence, blames it because of the care of things Or: from care or diligence. That is true.

If, therefore, he blames it regarding the care of things, providence is granted. It is so. †) The sense will be: The accuser of providence himself, (in that he does not wish to approve of some of its works), must confess that providence, and that of the best kind, is altogether necessary. With this conceded, the ridiculous human accusations concerning divine providence are easily dissolved. Auch.