Philonis Judaei Opera Omnia (Vol. 8)

Although when more evident observations, which we shall subject, have been adduced, then neither that other universal sophistic argument, brought around by a long detour, will be able to be brought forward, by which they strive to show that God did not ever begin the creation of this world, but has always been vacant to create this most beautiful universe. For it is unbecoming, they say, for the divinity ever to be without operation; since that belongs to leisure and inertia: but God created the universe, they say, without a beginning, not understanding the absurdity of such a hypothesis; since they, wishing to remove the smallest accusation from God, intend the greatest accusation against him.

§. 7. It remains, therefore, that they say that matter, lacking ornament, form, and shape, was endowed with quality and form by him, and that the shapes, which were not in it, were then assumed: for according to them, God never began to create it. But if that wise creation made by God founded the beautiful form of the world from matter itself, and from there matter obtained a very beautiful appearance, do they say that God did this one thing when he began to create the world, and that matter, which previously was accustomed to move without order, law, or direction, then obtained a beautiful order with ornament? Was matter itself in the place of a principle for God (when he was founding the world)? But the creator adorned it by continually understanding it. For God did not begin to understand before he acted; nor was there ever (a time) when he did not act, with the species (or ideas) themselves existing with him from the origin. For the will of God is not later, but his will is always with him; for natural movements never fail. And so by always understanding, he makes and provides the principle of existing to sensible things: so that these are always found conjointly, both that God acts by divine counsel and that sensible things receive the principle of existing. For it cannot happen that anything is done well through a benefit and meanwhile the benefit is not from the benefactor; so that he who gave, the benefactor, and he who received the benefit, both are participants of the good.