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PHIL. IUD. ON PROV. BOOK I. §. 27—30. 19
and care, nor any law established by anyone with beautiful providence (or foreknowledge).
§. 28. And how is this insane delirium not to be held, that when our intellect, which is the prince within us, has care for its body, for its herds, for its subjects, and for its children, He who is the prince and ruler of the universe, and as it were the provider of the contest, should have no care for the world? Should this not rather be established with greater reason?
§. 29. In the nature of a living thing there is indeed a prudent thought, adorning all things and effecting wise motions. Therefore, to those who look at bodies, it is manifestly evident that in those things which operate sensibly, there is the motion of a spirit moving beforehand and the invisible counsel of a soul foreseeing, so that the work of the instruments serving the work itself may be rendered more perfect. Not otherwise indeed are those motions diffused throughout the earth by providence to be accepted; so that even while not knowing the will of providence, we see already evidently that it has been accomplished. For it cannot be that all these things are thought to have proceeded from no mind or will, since even the smallest parts fulfill all things by the counsel and instinct of providence.
§. 30. But if the parts of the world and the particles of the parts deliver judgment upon the unworthy with discernment, and not thoughtlessly or rashly, how should it not be necessary above all to attribute certain provident counsel and the best wisdom to divine providence itself, on account of that principality by which it contains all the substance and virtue of public judgment? I do not know if the desire for truth burns in the judgment.