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...ext. h. t. VVesenb. in π.? ff. eod. n. 5. Now, of these proofs, some perform this duty more properly, while others rather relieve one from the burden of proving. To the former position and order I assign those which are made from the persons or the incorrupt faith of instruments, and which thus obtain the same force in the conducting of lawsuits, l. 11. & 15. C. de fid. instr. Rosbach in prax. civ. tit. 62. n. 37. in fin. Suchardus ad d. l. 15. n. 1. Donell. 25. comm. 15. lit. L. where Hillig. Also testimony, drawn from the evidence of a present controversial matter subject to the eyes of the Judge, and derogating from every other kind of proof, l. 8. §. 1. ff. fin. regund. Ruland. d. tr. p. 2. lib. 3. cap. 1. num. 2. with 7. seqq. & cap. 5. throughout. Coler d. tract. p. 3. capit. 9. num. 128. Mynsinger. 6. obser. 27. num. 5. Mascardus quæst. 8. n. 7. & seq. Gayl. 1. obs. 26. n. 9. In the latter class I judge should be placed: 1. The presumption of man, considered nakedly and absolutely without the intervention of other adminicles, cap. 9. caus. 6. q. 1. Sichardus ad l. 16. n. 7. C. h. VVesenb. in π.? ff. eod. n. 14. in fin. Pacianus cap. 9. n. 2. Menochius. 1. præsumt. 36. n. 14. & præsumt. seq. n. 3. Ummius n. 54. in fin. For if it pleases one to follow ἀκρίβειαν, that is, an exact and accurate method of speaking, it is not a legitimate proof. For although it may create faith in a controversial matter, and show it to be true as it is narrated, it does this not directly (which is an ἀχώριστον, as it were, πάθος and an inseparable attribute of proof), but at least obliquely, and insofar as we suppose such a thing on account of which our intention, if not necessarily, at least verisimilarly or probably, ought to be said to be true, Ummius. n. 29. VVesenb. n. 4. in med. It is otherwise if we contemplate a presumption of Law and from Law, Menochius d. præsumt. 36. n. 1. & 2., or if cases emerge in which proof of the truth is difficult and, as it were, impossible, Moller. p. 3. Const. Saxon. 5. n. 7. Ruland. d. tr. p. 1. lib. 1. c. 3. n. 10. 11. An oath, l. 30. ff. de jurejur. Tessaurus decis. Pedemont. 256. n. 2. Zangerus de Except. (old ed.) p. 2. cap. 19. n. 33. Modest. Pistor. p. 2. q. 79. n. 1. 2. 3. & 6. Beust. ad l. 3. n. 25. ff. de jurejur. Mascard. q. 9. n. 1. 2. & 3. Moller. p. 2. Const. 52. n. 12. Treutl. vol. 2. disp. 4. th. 1. lit. F. VVesenb. d. n. 4. Exception: unless it imparts an adminicular utility to an infirm and illegitimate proof, cap. 4. ext. h. Cujacius in π.? C. eod. P. Gregorius in meth. parv. Iur. li. 1. cap. 33. n. 14. Or if it be permitted to speak ἀγροικοτέραν Minervā and παχυμερέστερον. III. Confession, VVesenb. d. n. 4., if indeed we attend to a more pressed and stricter signification: Otherwise, if a broader one, Ummius disp. 13. n. 34.
Division n) follows the definition with a suitable and uninterrupted tenor of succession, which is considered twofold. o) For either PROOF is artificial or inartificial, p) or it is full q) or semi-full. r)
n) As it is next and subalternate to the same, and accommodated as much as possible to the labile and unstable capacity of human memory and to a leveled clarity, Cammannus disp. 2. de Regal. th. 4. & 2. seqq. Schneidvv. ad pr. Inst. de heredit. quæ ab intest. def. n. 1. & 2. & ad §. 29. n. 1. Instit. de act. & in proœm. tract. feud. n. 3. Mascard. d. vol. 1. in proœm. n. 7. 8. 9. The Magnificent and Most Distinguished Teacher, D. Johannes Suevius, most choice Councilor of the Most High Dukes of Saxony, Altenburg line, disput. F. 5. th. 2. lit. A. in note. o) The first of these [arises] from the efficient cause, to which, as closely as possible...