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...it approaches most closely, sought out, and is found translated from the oratorical workshop into the little garden beds and plots of law (Ummius, d. disput. 15. n. 4; Reusnerus, lib. 3. decis. 16. n. 11; Treutl. th. 2. lit. A). The second deserves to be derived from the effect and force which proof obtains in judicial cognition (Vvesenbec. d. n. 4. in pr.; Ummius, n. 5. in pr.), nor is it unknown to the legal sanctions (Donellus, 24. comm. 19. lit. D, where Hillig; Ummius, d. n. 5. & disp. 18. n. 1).
p) Artificial or internal [proof] is defined as that which is drawn from the cause itself by arguments and indications, or is procured by the art and industry of the one proving; but inartificial or external [proof] is that which is brought to the one proving from the outside. And it is said to be so, not because it is not treated with art once it has been brought forward, but because, for finding it, art is of no benefit, even if you should have searched most thoroughly. For whether there are witnesses, or documents regarding the matter about which one is inquiring, we attain these only by the admonition of others, not by art or ingenuity (Donellus, 25. comm. 5 in pr.; Pacianus, cap. 4. n. 1, 2, 3; Ummius & Vvesenbec, d. d. loc.). To the former are ascribed presumptions, which demonstrate a thing or its quality from another (Dn. Vulteius, 2. Iurispr. Rom. 2 n. 12), as by a sign and indication; and this is tripartite: namely, either τεκμήριον [proof], or necessary and indubitable, from which, once it is proven, that which we intend is necessarily effected, as if from the exclusion of a fetus I were to infer the inevitable corruption of virginity: Or verisimilar, proximate, and as it were certain (l. 8. §. 1. C. de quaest.), which for the most part argues that which is being doubted (cap. 2. ext. de praesums.); by the Greeks it is called εἰκὸς or εἰκότων, περὶ σημείων, and it cannot be included within the rule and standard of a definition: Or finally, uncertain and slight, which can fail in many ways—such as that which is assumed from maidenly breasts distended with milk to collect the subversion of virginity (a treasure of infinite price); or that which is usually drawn from the scattered speech of an ignorant and unskilled populace, to which malice usually gives a beginning and credulity an increase (Bocerus in tr. de quaest. & tortur. cap. 3. n. 18 & 19; Vvesenbec. n. 15. in pr.; Menochius. 1. praesumt. 3. n. 1 & 6. praesumt. 56. n. 2; Ummius, n. 36 & seq.; Cubach. cent. 3. dec. 2. q. 7. per tot.; l. un. in pr. C. de raptu virg.; Quintilianus, lib. 5. Inst. Orator. c. 3; Hartman. Pistor. lib. 1. q. 30. n. 35; Dn. Gothosr. Anton. disp. F. 15. th. 7. lit. H.; Donell. 25. comm. 6; Mascardus, conclus. 748. n. 4 & 7; Ummius, disp. 18. n. 12. infr. lit. R. in fin. τεκμηριάτων).
To this, however, belong the Laws, and the authority of witnesses and public instruments (Pacianus, d. cap. 4. num. 4, 5, 6). What shall we say of little letters cut and notched to one another (commonly called Receß or ausgeschnittne Zedel), likewise of split rods (Kerbhölzer), accepted by long-standing usage both among the followers of the countryside and among city dwellers, and so called because by notches cut transversely they demonstrate how much has been given or paid, or ought to be given or paid and performed? I assert that these create some credit of proof by the force of local custom, yet they are to be committed to the religious prudence of the judge (that is, of a man good, innocent, and solicitous to comply with equity) (l. 26. §. 2. ff. depos.; l. 2. C. quae sit long. consuet.; l. 4. §. 1. ff. fam. ercisc.; 2. F. 24. §. 2. vers. Sed quia natura &c.; Mantica, lib. 3. de conject. ult. vol. tit. 1 n. 17; Rulandus, d. tr. p. 2. lib. 5. cap 12. n. 6; Boër, decis. 105. n. 7 & 8).
q) And it is that which concludes fully, and requires no aid or patronage of another (Sichardus ad rubr. n. 4. C. h.; Mascardus, q. 4. n. 12). Let there depart, therefore, that received or common OPINION of the jurists, stripped and destitute of these measures of perfection and absolution, which, from the innate desire to dissent of all those who subscribe to it, and from a confidence in reckless πολυλογίας [loquacity] in which they sometimes seethe, [is derived]...