... Hanc syllogen generalem materiae probatoriae

POSITION V.

ABOVE, ὡς ἐν παραδρομῇ [as if in passing], that is, cursorily and by a leap, we touched upon the Object or Matter with which PROOF is concerned u.) Now, we shall explain it further. To it, therefore, as if fixed by the deepest roots, adheres every controverted and uncertain question vv) of law and fact x), pertaining to the heart of the case and its decision y), whether it be criminal or civil z).

u) Above, th. 2, lit. K, in the beginning of the note. vv) l. 16, C. h. What if the matter has been placed in plain view and in public light? R. Nevertheless, the truth, as the very substance and firmness of things, subsists inviolate and untouched, like the rock of Marpessa, and is not pulled apart by the assent or dissent of one or another individual, l. 6, in fin. princ. ff. ad munic. l. 6, § 1, ff. de off. Praes. l. 29, § 1, ff h. Virgil, Aeneid 6. Colerius, d. tr. p. 1, cap. 3, n. 43 & 106, & p. 4, c. 1, n. 42. Ventura de Valent. in Parthen. litig. lib. 2, c. 8, n. 36. Cæsar Contardus ad l. diffamari, §. C. de ingen. manumiss. cap. 1, n. 9, so that the natural conflict of things and the hateful multiformity of minds and spirits may be avoided, and a decent and beautiful face of affairs may arise everywhere. Above, th. 1, lit. B, in the ὑπομνήματα [memoranda]. For by concord (to be preferred to the most vile and shameful gain, and far more renowned than the most renowned, l. 5, C. de Instit. & subst. Nov. 30, cap. 1, in fin. pr.), small things grow, by discord the greatest fall apart, Ventura de Valent. d. Parthen. litig. lib. 2, cap. 4, n. 19. Gayl. 1, de pac. publ. 1, n. 4, & seq. Much less should a legitimate trust in truth be applied through proof if a matter has received an end to controversies by the pronunciation of a Judge, l. 1, ff. de re iud. Vmmius disp. 18, n. 14, or has been settled by a decent and convenient transaction, l. 229, & seq. ff. de V. S. Vvesenb. in παρ. [parallels] ff. h. n. 7, post. pr.; both because the public authority and eminence of judgments, sprinkled with the evident stain of sinister suspicion, will be rendered evanescent and momentary by a most evil example, l. 4, C. de re iud. l. ult. ff. ne quid in loc. publ. Hering. cap. 16, n. 25. Vvesenb. in παρ. ff. de transact. n. 5, à pr. Mollerus p. 1, Const. 32, n. 1 & 2. Then, because lawsuits and judicial processes—whose web, otherwise, in the most ruined customs of the present age, outlasts the long lives of even crows and stags—are protracted and drawn out with the most manifest dissolution of human society and ineffable detriment, and become almost immortal and infinite, l. 13, in pr. & l. 16, C. de iud. cap. 2, ext. de sent. & re iud. Moller. d. p. 1, Const. 3, n. 9. Donellus 24, comm. 6, lit. D, where Hillig. Colerius d tr p. 1, cap. 1, n. 10 & 12, & p. 3, cap. 11, n. 95. Surdus decis. 120, n. 7 & 8; when, however, both nature (the provident parent and nurse of things) and the law itself abhor and turn away from infinity with the greatest effort. Aristotle, 2, Physic. 3. Gayl in tr. de Arest cap. 11, n. 11, cap. 2, de rescript. in 6. X) And indeed, concerning a controversy over a contingent fact, the matter is plain and does not require accurate and scrupulous inquiry. Fr. Pfeil centur. 2, cons. 105, n. 11. What if the Law wavers between dissenting parties? That, indeed, when we extend our hand, shines forth more clearly and brightly with the solar lamp.