... Hanc syllogen generalem materiae probatoriae

u. From the numerous and abundant efflorescence of common opinions, by the hostile and disastrous floods of which the most powerful articles of Law are attacked and agitated in a horrible manner.

11. From cases or questions for a friend (as they call them), where the Doctors say they are prepared to give counsel on what a friend has requested. But you would more truly call them cases for the devil, since they provide a cause for dragging [people] to the infernal regions; Donellus, 3 Comm. 23, lit. A, where Hillig [is cited], and 26 Comm. 2, lit. A, fol. 1398. P. Gilken ad l. 25, n. 7, Inst. de R. D.; Treutl. vol. 1, disp. 1, th. 1, lit. B. For friendship must be sought through honorable, not shameful and disgraceful reasons; l. 223, § 1, and there Gædd. n. 2, ff. de V. S.; Pacianus, d. tr. lib. 2, cap. 44, n. 85, 88, & 91; Gayl. 2, de pac. publ. 10, n. 30, & 2 seqq.; Sichardus ad l. 4, n. 3, de testib. And, Plato is a friend, Socrates is a friend, but truth is a greater friend; Mascardus, concl. 86, n. 11, 12, & 14; Erasmus Roterod. Chil. 3, cent. 2, adag. 10; Aristotle, 1 Ethic. Nicom. 7.

III. From the cases handed down by the Doctors, in which is attributed the power and license of giving counsel on either side with a safe conscience; l. V. From l. 79, § 1, ff. de iud.

We conclude, therefore, that Law is indeed proven, but only ἀνυπολόγως [inaccountably] and improperly, and by an accidental event (above th. 2, lit. K, in the middle of hypothesis y), i.e., that which is proven profits the one proving it and serves the suit; l. 15, C. de rescind. vend., l. 21, C. h.; Pfeil, cent. 1, conf. 13, v. 111; Mollerus, p. 3, Const. 20, n. 38; Ventura de Valentiis, Parthen. litig. lib. 1, cap. 15, n. 11; Vmmius, disput. 6, n. 55; Surdus, decis. 75, n. 17; Vvesenb. in παρ. [parallels] ff. h. n. 3, & n. 7, vers. Ea a facta etc. For it is the same thing that something is non-existent as it is that it is vicious; l. 1, ff. de auctor. & consens. tut.; Reusnerus, lib. 3, decis. 4, n. 25; Gayl. 1, obs. 21, n. 12; Mollerus, p. 1, Const. 2, n. 2; and when legal form is not observed, nothing is accomplished; Pfeil, cent. 1, cons. 78, n. 125; Mollerus, d. p. 1, Const. 29, n. 3. Whence, πορισματικῶς [as a corollary] and by way of conclusion, it is easy to infer that notoriously impertinent articles (which are not taken and formed from the vitals of the pleading, nor are they conformable to it and the proposed action) are by no means to be received in judgment; Rosbach, in prax. civ. tit. 54, n. 6, & 2 seqq.; Ventura de Val., Parthen. litig. lib. 2, cap. 13, n. 25; Gayl. 1, obs. 81, n. 1 & seqq.; Vvesenb. d. n. 7; Vmmius, disp. 15, n. 15 & 18; Rulandus, d. tr. p. 1, lib. 5, cap. 3, n. 2, & 5, cap. 4, n. 1 & 2, & cap. 5, n. 6; so that the parties may not be vexed by vain expenses; l. 1, ff. de inoff. test., l. 28, in fin. C. de Episcop. aud.; and the fabric of the trial may not be made more intricate and obstructed; Treutl. vol. 2, disp. 4, th. 5, lit. C. What if it is not clear to the Judge whether they are relevant? R. They are to be received with the customary clause, "Saving the right of the impertinent [matters], etc.," because it is safer to admit what is superfluous than to omit what is necessary; Coler. d. tr. p. 1, cap. 2, n. 201; Rulandus, d. cap. 4, n. 3. And in doubt (here a more benign interpretation is to be taken; l. 8, ff. quæ in fraud. credit.; Rulandus, p. 1, lib. 2, cap. 19, n. 4; Hering. cap. 5, n. 190; Vvesenb. in παρ. ff. h. n. 15, vers. Sic præsumitur semper etc.; Gayl. d. loc. n. 10), it suffices that they be even slightly pertinent; Pacianus, cap. 5, n. 21; Rosbach, in prax: civ. tit. 64, n. 20.

z.) Above, th. 2, lit. K, in the middle, where it was said that a disparate manner of proving is employed on both sides, according to the quality and condition of the subject matter, or καθ' ὑποκειμένην ὕλην [according to the underlying matter]. What, therefore, is that? I will explain it by applying the temperament of distinction (which is nearest to the truth; Mantica, lib. 8, de coniect. ult. vol. tit. 3, n. 9). There are 1. Capital criminal cases. As these are greater and more weighty than civil contentions; l. ult. C. de ord. iud., l. 10, § 2, ff. de pœn.; Heigius, p. 1, q. 39, n. 42; Parthen. litig. lib. 1, cap. 5, n. 34; so they require a richer and fuller faith of the truth; l. ult. C. h., l. 16, C. de pœn.; Bœerius, decis. 288, n. 2, circa fin.; Mascardus, concl. 34, n. 3, & conclus. 459, n. 2; Reusnerus