... Hanc syllogen generalem materiae probatoriae

28. n. 2, 3, & 4. (serving as a substitute for a moderate relaxation and interval, by the argument of the things handed down by Heigius, p. 1, q. 16, n. 23, and Rauchbar, p. 2, q. 24, n. 33 & seq.). For a just cause, however, it is extended and amplified; Vimmius, disp. 7, n. 14 & seq.; Mollerus, n. 7 & seqq.; Donellus, 24, com. 6, lit. A & B, where Hillig; and Gayl, 1, obs. 91, n. 1, with seqq.; Rulandus, d. tr., p. 1, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 4, with 3 seqq. & n. 11; Treutler, th. 6, lit. D. Moreover, the proof of a case primarily contested (and indeed judicial, of which we treat here, l. 24, C. h. Supra th. 2, lit. M, in pr. hypomnēmatikon) is instituted and proposed regularly after the lawsuit has been accepted, or the litis contestatio has occurred, l. 23, ff. de iud.; Rauchbarus, p. 1, q. 28, n. 7; Vvesenbecius, n. 9, in pr.; Treutler, d. th. 6, lit. A; Vimmius, d. disp. 15, n. 22, in pr., unless perhaps temporal and dilatory exceptions have arisen, opposed to the very causes being brought into judgment, Vimmius, disp. 8, n. 7 & 62 & d. n. 22; the Magnificent and Most Ample Dn. Preceptor D. Johannes Svevius, in praelect. publ. ad tit. ff. de Except., cap. 2, a pr.; Donellus, 22, comm. 9, lit. Cc, where Hillig; Mollerus, p. 1, Const. 3, in pr.; Treutler, d. loc., lit. B.

POSITIO VII.

By way of an appendix, it also pleases to point toward the end and effect of proof. c)

c) For it is indeed the most powerful end of all cases (from which, as from an inexhaustible and perennial spring, all knowledge flows, and the rust of ignorance is cast off, Surdus, decis. 246, n. 16; Guldens in tr. de sequestr. posses., cap. 2, n. 23, in fin.; Cubach in Brocard. general., cap. 5, Brocard. 15), and it moderates the entire business, Schultes, d. p. 2, q. pract. 53, n. 24 & n. 92, with seq.; Rauchbarus, p. 1, q. 38, n. 15; Gayl, 2, obs. 53, n. 7; Reufnerus, lib. 4, decis. 7, num. 44, with 2 seqq.; Modest. Pistor., p. 3, q. 122, n. 152 & 2 seqq.; Dn. Arumaeus, lib. 2, decis. 4, n. 31 & decis. 10, n. 17 & seq.; Pantzschmanus, lib. 2, q. pract. 21, num. 72; Cubach in Brocard. general., cap. 10, Brocard. 1 & 33; Supra th. 2, lit. M, in pr. not.

POSITIO IIX.

This turns upon the point that, according to the proofs, if they are sufficient, it should be pronounced in favor of the claimant, and the adversary moving the lawsuit with reckless daring should be subjected to the appropriate severity of punishment. d)

d) For it is not right that a bridle should be given to the litigious and frustrating malice of men of abandoned audacity (not unlike the chameleon and the polypus), l. 38, ff. de R. V.; Pfeil, cent. 1, cons. 78, n. 62, circa fin.; Parthenius, litigios., lib. 2, cap. 5, n. 1 & 7; Gayl, 1, obs. 31, n. 4; Dn. Arumaeus, lib. 1, decis. 9, n. 1; Schneidewin ad § 1, n. 10, Inst. de pæn. tem. litig.; Heigius, p. 1, q. 35, n. 17; Musculus, d. tr., class. 1, memb. 3, num. 45 & seq. What if the actor and the reus or "fleeing party" (for so he is called in the middle of l. 13, § 2, C. de iud.; Donellus, 17, comm. 5, lit. B, where Hillig; Mollerus, p. 1, Const. 4, n. 8; Parthenius, litigios., lib. 1, c. 8, n. 26; Colerus, d. tr., p. 1, c. 2, n. 43 & p. 4, c. 1, n. 252) rely upon the equilibrium weight of proofs? I would think that a white stone ought to be assigned to the defendant; since we ought to be inclined and prone in our course and nod toward embracing the liberation of the defendant, l. 47, ff. de O. & A.; Phil. Matthaeus ad l. 41, n. 8 & 2 seqq., ff. de R. I.; Dn. Johannes